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Note
GATS Regulation for Launch Services: Resolving
the United States-India Conflict
Shane Fitzmaurice
A long time ago, when only the Soviet Union and the United
States operated in outer space, launch services were far too
limited to be a concern for international trade.1 The militarilyfocused space programs prevented any commercialization.2
However, the growth of telecommunications changed the
picture.3 Upon venturing into the final frontier, mankind created
a space industry worth hundreds of billions of dollars.4
The demand for telecommunications—television, telephone,
radio, and internet5—motivated other countries to start
launching satellites into orbit.6 Concomitantly, companies

Shane Fitzmaurice is J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota
Law School for the class of 2018. Fitzmaurice received his B.A. in Economics
and Spanish from the University of Wisconsin, Madison in 2015.
1. Stephan Hobe, The Impact of New Developments on International Space
Law (New Actors, Commercialisation, Privatisation, Increase in the Number of
“Space-faring Nations”), 15 UNIFORM L. REV. 869, 869–70 (2010).
2. Id. (“Space activities were strictly government-led, with a strong
military foundation, both in what was then the Soviet Union and the United
States of America . . . .”).
3. See id. at 872 (“[T]elecommunications is by far the most lucrative space
application.”).
4. Fed. Aviation Admin. Office of Comm. Space Transp., Ann.
Compendium
of
Comm.
Space
Transp.:
2016, at 1 (2016),
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2016_
Compendium.pdf [hereinafter FAAOCST] (“The size of the global space
industry . . . is estimated to be about $324 billion.”).
5. Telecommunications Satellites, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, http://www.
esa.int/Our_Activities/Telecommunications_Integrated_Applications/Telecom
munications_satellites (last updated Dec. 10, 2012) (explaining the various
services of telecommunications); What is the Telecommunications Sector?,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 8, 2015, 10:11 AM EDT), http://www.investopedia.com/
ask/answers/070815/what-telecommunications-sector.asp.
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Howell, Arianespace: Satellite Launch Company,
SPACE.COM (Apr. 11, 2017, 3:26 PM ET), http://www.space.com/36332arianespace.html (explaining that Arianespace was created to offer
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around the world involved in space activities have enjoyed great
success.7
In the United States, for example, small satellite
(“smallsat”) companies are booming.8 However, there is not
enough domestic launching infrastructure to meet their
demand.9 Currently, smallsats can only reach orbit if they hitch
a ride with larger payloads.10 Smallsat companies strongly
prefer to be the primary payload so they can set their own launch
dates.11
India owns and operates the world’s most coveted smallsat
launcher, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV).12 The
United States is willing to let its smallsat companies freely
launch on the PSLV so long as India signs the Commercial Space

telecommunications services and has shareholders from multiple European
countries); Genesis, INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORG., http://www.isro.gov.in/
about-isro/genesis (last visited May 27, 2017) (explaining that I.S.R.O.’s
development focused on telecommunications).
7. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., The Space Economy at a Glance
2014: Highlights, at 4 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/sti/futures/space-economy-ata-glance-2014-highlights.pdf [hereinafter OECD].
8. Peter B. de Selding, U.S. Launch Companies Lobby to Maintain Ban on
Indian Rockets, SPACENEWS.COM (Mar. 29, 2016), http://spacenews.com/u-sspace-transport-companies-lobby-to-maintain-ban-on-use-of-indian-rockets/
(“The U.S. small satellite industry has taken off in recent years, with several
companies moving quickly from aspiration to execution.”).
9. Aditya Madanapalle, Isro PSLV-C37 Mission: The US Private Sector Is
Threatened by Cheap Indian Spaceflight, FIRSTPOST (Feb. 10, 2017 10:27 IST),
http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/isro-pslv-c37-mission-the-us-privatesector-is-threatened-by-cheap-indian-spaceflight-361706.html (“US industries
make a steady stream of satellites, but they do not have enough launch vehicles
to place all of them to orbit.”).
10. See Selding, supra note 8 (“[Launch service] companies have said
options are limited for satellites whose size means they can never order, on their
own, a full U.S. launch vehicle in today’s market . . . . The larger rockets, which
occasionally make room for secondary passengers, launch when their larger
primary passengers are ready, not before.”).
11. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2 (“[T]he value is in scheduling; small
satellite operators, especially those with constellations of many satellites, can
have greater control over their business plans.”).
12. See Michael Safi, India Launches Record-Breaking 104 Satellites from
Single Rocket, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2017, 6:45 EST) https://www.theguardian.
com/science/2017/feb/15/india-launches-record-breaking-104-satellites-fromsingle-rocket (“The [PSLV] launch helps to cement India’s place as a serious
player in the burgeoning private space market, expected to significantly grow
as the demand for telecommunications services increases.”); R. S. Venkatesh,
PSLV – Travel Beyond the Blue, VIKATAN.COM (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:39 PM),
http://www.vikatan.com/news/english/80953-pslv--the-travel-beyond-the-blueisro-vikataninfographic.html (illustrating that the PSLV is a global vehicle).
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Launch Act (CSLA),13 which prohibits India from selling launch
services at cheaper prices than those offered by the United
States.14 The United States, for its part, fears that freely
importing launch services risks the very existence of its own
launch industry.15 India, however, has refused to sign the
CSLA.16
The ongoing conflict between India and the United States is
not the first in the international trade of launch services.17
Regulation in this arena is long overdue. Without it, the evolving
launch-service landscape threatens to aggravate the problem.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is
well-equipped to put an end to the tension that exists in the
international trade of launch services. This note examines the
United States-India conflict, which is a microcosm of the
international situation, through the lens of the GATS.
Section I provides background on the international launch
service industry, the United States-India conflict, other similar
conflicts within the international trade of launch services, space
law, and the GATS. Section II analyzes why regulation of launch
services is necessary and how the GATS can facilitate the
international trade of launch services by carefully examining the
United States–India conflict and debunking the typical
misconceptions that arise in this context.

13. Michael J. Listner, India’s Commercial Space Conundrum, SPACE
THOUGHTS (July 6, 2016), https://spacethoughtsblog.wordpress.com/2016/07/
06/indias-commercial-space-conundrum/.
14. Id.
15. Selding, supra note 8, (“[T]he FAA said it agreed with its Commercial
Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) that Indian launch
services, owned and controlled by the Indian government, threaten to ‘distort
the conditions of competition’ in the launch-services market.”).
16. Listner, supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., Timothy A. Brooks, Regulating International Trade in Launch
Services, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 59, 68 (1991) (“[T]he European Space Agency (ESA),
in keeping with its criticism of NASA’s failure to separate the commercial and
research elements of its program, transferred its launch services to the French
corporation Arianespace in March 1980.”).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE INTERNATIONAL LAUNCH SERVICE INDUSTRY

The need for telecommunication satellites in orbit led to the
development of a global industry that dedicates itself to
launching satellites into outer space.18 A “launch service”
includes everything from “contract signing through mission
management and on-orbit delivery.”19 Initially, only a few
countries could sell launch services because the required
technology was too advanced.20 As technology became more
accessible, more countries started launching satellites.21
Nowadays, many countries reach orbit on a frequent basis;
several European countries do so through their private
launching service Arianespace,22 and India does so through its
government-run Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).23
China and Japan also launch on a regular basis,24 and many
other countries are eager to follow suit.25
The global space economy, largely driven by demand for

18. See Hobe, supra note 1, at 872.
19. About ILS, ILS, http://www.ilslaunch.com/about-us (last visited Jan.
28, 2017).
20. See OECD, supra note 7, at 4 (“During the cold war, major scientific and
engineering breakthroughs took place in different parts of the world, often in
isolation, as military research and development and industrial secrecy forced
economies to preserve their own technological advances.”).
21. Id. (“In the 1980s, only a handful of countries had the capacity to build
and launch a satellite. Many more countries and corporate players across a wide
range of industrial sectors are now engaged in space related activities, a trend
that is expected to strengthen in the future.”).
22. Hobe, supra note 1, at 15; Howell, supra note 6.
23. About ISRO, DEP’T OF INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORG., http://www.isro.
gov.in/about-isro (last visited July 22, 2017).
24. See PETER VAN FENEMA, Legal Aspects of Launch Services and Space
Transportation, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 382, 394–95 (Frans von der Dunk
& Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
25. See id. at 396 (showing that the list of countries that have performed at
least one successful launch has grown to include Brazil, Iran, Israel, North
Korea, and South Korea).
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telecommunications,26 is skyrocketing.27 Its value was estimated
in 2005 to be between $170–234 billion.28 Only a decade later,
the value of the space economy reached about $324 billion.29
The tremendous growth has resulted, in part, from the
world reaching orbit more frequently.30 The constant need for
internet connectivity has required an ever-increasing amount of
satellites in space.31 India, for example, offers huge potential
market for satellite industries because it has a sizable
population but much of it is does not yet connect to the
internet.32 Experts predict that launches around the world will
increase by thirty percent in order to accommodate for countries
such as India.33
Although the space economy has grown remarkably and
continues to grow,34 the commercial launch service market has
not kept pace.35 This is because the launching infrastructure is
not yet equipped to meet the latent demand generated by
smallsat companies.36 Currently, these smallsats must hitch a
ride on launches carrying larger payloads.37 This is suboptimal
26. Gary Oleson, Effects of Changing Economics on Space Architecture and
Engineering, THE SPACE REVIEW (May 16, 2016), http://www.thespacereview.
com/article/2986/1 (“Commercial markets make up more than three-quarters of
space industry markets, mostly driven by global telecommunications.”); see also
The Space Report 2016, SPACE FOUNDATION (2016), https://www.space
foundation.org/sites/default/files/downloads/The_Space_Report_2016_overview
.pdf (explaining that the commercial sector, consisting of telecommunications,
broadcasting, and Earth observation, constitutes the largest sector).
27. The Space Report 2010 Reveals Global Space Economy Grew 40 Percent
Over Five Years, SPACE FOUNDATION (Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Space Report
2010],
https://www.spacefoundation.org/media/press-releases/space-report2010-reveals-global-space-economy-grew-40-percent-over-five-years.
28. OECD, The Space Economy at a Glance 2007: Highlights, at 15 (2007),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264040847-en.
29. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 1.
30. See id. (“[T]he annual number of orbital launches conducted worldwide
has steadily increased.”).
31. Kyunghee Park et al., High Hopes for Satellites, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, May 23, 2016, at 19.
32. Id. at 20.
33. Id. at 19.
34. OECD, supra note 7, at 1 (“[T]he number of countries and companies
investing in space systems and their downstream applications continues to
grow.”).
35. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2.
36. Id.; OECD, supra note 7, at 7 (“Small satellites have become in the past
five years more attractive than ever, due to their lower development costs and
shorter production lead times.”).
37. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2.
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as the companies prefer to have their own launches so they can
choose their own launch dates.38
The new movement in space transportation, “NewSpace,”
reflects this need for entrepreneurship and innovation in order
to meet the demand in the smallsat market.39 Launch service
providers are developing special vehicles that make it easier for
smallsats to reach orbit.40 SpaceX, for example, made aerospace
history on March 30, 2017, when it reused a rocket.41
Unfortunately, NewSpace does not provide an immediate
solution to the lack of smallsat launch services.42 Profit-driven
companies simply prefer to launch their satellites on an
available foreign launch vehicle instead of waiting until
domestic launch service industries catch up to speed.43 The most
popular of these foreign launch vehicles is India’s PSLV, a rocket
that caters towards smallsats,44 which attracts worldwide
demand.45 On February 15, 2017, the PSLV successfully
38. Id.
39. See Gerrard Cowan, It’s a New Space Age for Satellite Builders, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 3, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-a-new-space-age-forsatellite-builders-1475460122.
40. FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2; Oleson, supra note 26 (“The lack of
dedicated launch vehicles to deliver smallsats to their preferred orbits has
attracted more than a dozen potential new entrants to the launch services
business.”); e.g., FAAOCST, supra note 4, at Orbital Launch Vehicle Fact Sheets
(stating that Firefly Space Systems is designing an “aerospike” engine, redirects
the exhaust in a way that makes the engine lighter and more efficient, and is
specifically catered towards smallsats); LauncherOne Service Guide Version
2.0, VIRGIN GALACTIC 2 (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.virgingalactic.com/assets/
uploads/2014/11/VG_LauncherOne_ServiceGuide_v0.2_OSR.pdf (showing how
Virgin Galactic is designing an airplane to send the small payloads into orbit).
41. James Dean, SpaceX Launches, Lands Used Falcon 9 Rocket in Historic
First, FLA. TODAY (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.floridatoday.com/story/tech/
science/space/spacex/2017/03/30/spacex-launches-lands-falcon9-in-historicmission-kennedy-space-center-florida-ses10/99815686/.
42. See FAAOCST, supra note 4, at 2.
43. Cody Knipfer, Of India and ICBMs: Two Current Concerns for
American Small-Satellite Launch, SPACE REV. (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2969/1
(“American
small-satellite
manufacturers and operators, many of whom have plans to fly large
constellations of Earth observation or telecommunications spacecraft, want to
use now whatever launch platforms that are available and affordable.”).
44. See id. (“[T]he PSLV is a substantially cheaper platform with greater
capabilities than most of its competition.”).
45. See Peter B. de Selding, India’s ISRO: Protectionist Satellite Telecom
Policy Is Good Business for Us, SPACE INTEL REP. (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.spaceintelreport.com/indias-isro-protectionist-satellite-telecompolicy-is-good-business-for-us/ (“The PSLV launch vehicle has seen a
substantial growth in its appeal to non-Indian operators of small, and some not-
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launched a payload of 104 foreign satellites into orbit,46
shattering the previously-held record by Russia for the most
number of satellites sent into space on a single launch.47
However, India subsidizes the PSLV,48 and American
launch service providers worry that they cannot compete with
the prices.49 Fortunately for the American providers, the United
States has a longstanding policy against satellite exports (in
other words, importing launch services) by American
manufacturers.50 The United States defends its policy by
arguing that freely exporting satellites threatens to destroy its
launch service industry.51

so-small, commercial Earth observation satellites . . . . The office of India’s
prime minister said revenue from foreign satellite owners using the PSLV
rocket between 2013 and 2015 totaled $101 million.”); Malavika Vyawahare,
ISRO Launch: Why US Companies Face Trouble Engaging with India’s Space
Agency, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/isro-launch-why-us-companies-face-trouble-engaging-with-india-sspace-agency/story-CiPWjGho5zsk08tigBJLLJ.html (“The reason ISRO [owner
of the PSLV] is preferred by foreign companies for satellite launches [is] because
it is able to send them to space at a cheaper rate compared to an American
company like SpaceX.”).
46. ISRO Sets Space Record: Highlights of Successful Launch of
Cartosat-2 and 103 Other Satellites, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/final-countdown-isro-hours-awayfrom-record-launch-of-104-satellites-into-space/story-yfC70LKVupmiagGxWvn
W0I.html; see also Peter B. de Selding, U.S. Policy on India’s Rockets: Dead Man
Walking, SPACE INTEL REP. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.spaceintelreport.
com/us-policy-on-indias-rockets-dead-man-walking/ (“The successful launch
Feb. 15 [sic] of India’s PSLV rocket carrying 104 satellites testifies to the
vehicle’s increasing flexibility and a much-needed provider of launch services
for owners of very small satellites for commercial companies and research
organizations.”).
47. See ISRO Sets Space Record: Highlights of Successful Launch of
Cartosat-2 and 103 Other Satellites, supra note 46 (“It puts a wide margin
between it and the next record holder, the Russian Space Agency that launched
37 satellites in 2014.”).
48. See Knipfer, supra note 43 (“The PSLV was developed as an ISRO
program, and the profits made off commercial launch feeds back into India’s
space budget. This does constitute government subsidy of the Indian launch
market; in contrast, the American companies developing small launch vehicles
have done so largely through private investment, with NASA purchasing their
services through fixed-price contracts.”); see also Madanapalle, supra note 9
(“[T]he [U.S.] committee [on Science, Space, and Technology] found that India
was ‘dumping’ the launch vehicles in the commercial market to the detriment
of US firms.”).
49. See Madanapalle, supra note 9.
50. See id.
51. See Vyawahare, supra note 45.

290

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

Profit is not the only concern in the international trade of
launch services. Some countries are reluctant to send their
satellites to foreigners because they worry that the sensitive
technology risks national security.52 In fact, some countries
perceive trading satellites to be so dangerous that they have
formed international regimes for protection.53 The most
prominent is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).54
It is “an informal and voluntary association of countries which
share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery
systems.”55
The MTCR regulates trade with a set of guidelines in the
form of two categories of items.56 “Complete rocket and
unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including . . . space launch
vehicles . . . )” are the first category,57 and these items are
generally banned as exports.58 The guidelines give more exportflexibility to the second category of items, which consists of
missiles that may have uses other than delivering weapons of
mass destruction.59
Most importantly, the MTCR Guidelines explicitly state
that they are “not designed to impede national space programs
or international cooperation in such programs as long as such
programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction.”60 Simply put, the MTCR discourages
cooperation when it threatens world security, but otherwise
encourages countries to cooperate in launching innocuous items
such as telecommunication satellites.61

52. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 417; see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE AND
STATE, RISK ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES SPACE EXPORT CONTROL POLICY
2 (2012) [hereinafter RISK ASSESSMENT].
53. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 418–21 (introducing the different
regimes that govern national security for satellite exports).
54. See id. at 421 (explaining that other armament-related export regimes
should not control items that are already covered by the MTCR).
55. Id. at 418.
56. Id. at 419.
57. MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex,
MISSILE TECH. CONTROL REGIME, http://mtcr.info/mtcr-guidelines/ (last visited
June 3, 2017) [hereinafter MCTR Guidelines].
58. Fenema, supra note 24, at 419 (“[These items] are licensed for export
only on rare occasions.”).
59. See MTCR Guidelines, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 419.
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The United States has been a member of the MTCR since its
establishment in 1987.62 India became the newest member in
June of 2016.63 Membership in this regime puts countries in a
better position to conduct more launches because it garners trust
from the other members.64 India, for example, gained “access to
high-end testing technology for its solid rocket booster
propulsion system, which fires up the first stage of the [PSLV],”
when it became a member of the MTCR.65
United States legislation has dealt with the national
security aspects of satellite exports. “Until the late 1980s,
[United States] export regulations distinguished between
communications satellites built for military, defence and
national security purposes and satellites destined for civil and/or
commercial use . . . .”66 During this time, the Executive branch
decided whether the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR), controlled by the strict Department of State,67 or Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), controlled by the
Department of Commerce,68 applied.69

62. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), NUCLEAR THREAT
INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/missile-technologycontrol-regime-mtcr/ (last updated Feb. 1, 2017).
63. Id.
64. See MTCR Membership to Help India Export Satellites and Launch
Vehicles: Govt, DECCAN CHRONICLE, July 21, 2016, http://www.deccanchronicle.
com/nation/current-affairs/210716/mtcr-membership-to-help-india-exportsatellites-and-launch-vehicles-govt.html.
65. Pranab Dhal Samanta, ISRO Aided by India’s Entry into Elite MTCR
Club, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/news/science/isro-aided-by-indias-entry-into-elite-mtcr-club/articleshow/
57195341.cms.
66. Fenema, supra note 24, at 429.
67. ITAR and EAR compliance, WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.techtarget.com/
definition/ITAR-and-EAR-compliance (last updated Feb. 2012) (“[ITAR is]
[s]trict regulatory licensing—does not address commercial or research
objectives.”); The International Traffic in Arms Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar.html (last updated
Sept. 6, 2017).
68. Export Licensing, (ITAR and EAR), U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF INDUS. AND SEC. (May 2013), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-doc
uments/technology-evaluation/781-export-licensing/file (“The U.S. Department
of Commerce is responsible for implementing and enforcing EAR.”).
69. Fenema, supra note 24, at 429–30.
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The enactment of the Strom Thurmond Act in 1998,70 a
reaction to international tension at the time,71 drastically
changed this procedure.72 The Act stated that
[D]ue to the military sensitivity of the technologies
involved, it is in the national security interest of the
United States that United States satellites and related
items be subject to the same export controls that apply
under United States law and practices to munitions . . .
all satellites and related items that are on the Commerce
Control List of dual-use items . . . shall be transferred to
the United States Munitions List . . . .73
In other words, the executive branch no longer had the
power to determine that a satellite could receive lenient export
controls under the EAR instead of the strict ITAR controls.74
The new categorical regulation severely hindered the
United States satellite industry:
[T]he value of contracts lost due to ITAR between 2003
and 2006 was 2.35 billion dollars . . . . In 1995, United
States satellite manufacturers enjoyed a 75 percent
share of the global market; ten years later, this has
dropped to 41 percent, and has hovered between 35 and
50 percent since then. ITAR has become a market
differentiator . . . .75
its

The United States satellite industry begged for reform, and
backlash about overregulation eventually reached

70. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261 §§ 1511–1516, 112 Stat. 1920, 2173–2178 (1998)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2017)) [hereinafter Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act].
71. Fenema, supra note 24, at 430–31 (explaining that the fear that the
Chinese obtained sensitive United States technology resulted in the adoption of
the Act).
72. Id. at 431.
73. Id.; Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act §§ 1511,
1513.
74. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 431.
75. Export Controls, Arms Sales, and Reform: Balancing U.S. Interests,
Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 31 (2012)
(statement of Patricia A. Cooper, President, Satellite Industry Association)
[hereinafter Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs].
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Congress.76 In 2012, the State and Defense Departments
submitted a report to Congress that outlined many of the defects
of the current export regime.77 It stated that “[t]he U.S.
Government’s control of commercial satellites . . . as munitions
items is not effective in protecting U.S. national security because
some dual-use satellites . . . equivalent to those originating in
the United States are available from non-U.S. providers.”78 It
also noted that “[o]ver the last [fifteen] years, a substantial
number of commercial satellite systems . . . have become less
critical to national security[,] [and] [d]uring that time, other
countries have become more proficient in space technologies.”79
For these reasons, the report recommended that the “authority
to determine the appropriate export control status of satellites
and space-related items be returned to the President.”80
Congress listened, and in 2013, it enacted the National
Defense Authorization Act,81 which returned the power to
determine satellite export controls to the executive branch.82 As
a result, innocuous items such as telecommunication satellite
exports were to be controlled by lenient Department of
Commerce controls instead of automatically being controlled by
strict Department of State controls.83
B. THE UNITED STATES-INDIA CONFLICT
The ongoing conflict between the United States and India
hinges on India’s refusal to sign the CSLA.84 Without India’s
signature, the United States bans its smallsat companies from
freely launching on the highly-coveted PSLV.85 Although
protests from the smallsat companies have pressured the United
States into allowing waivers to the ban,86 the United States only
grants these waivers on a case-by-case basis.87 Smallsat
76. Fenema, supra note 24, at 435.
77. Id.
78. RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 52, at 1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted); see also Fenema, supra note
24, at 435.
82. Fenema, supra note 24, at 435.
83. See id. at 435–36.
84. See Listner, supra note 13.
85. Id.
86. See Vyawahare, supra note 45.
87. Id. (“If American companies must launch in India they need to apply
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companies greatly prefer to launch at whim on the PSLV.88
The CSLA protects the American industry from competing
with subsidized markets.89 It prohibits government owned
foreign launch service providers from selling launch services at
prices lower than those offered by the United States.90 The
United States launch service industry insists that the
prohibition is necessary to prevent itself from being overrun.91
India, however, refuses to accept the agreement.92 India
feels that its low prices can make it a prominent player in the
international satellite launch market even without the
launching of American satellites.93 Because the CSLA only
applies to government-owned launch service providers, India
can circumvent it by privatizing the PSLV.94 In fact, India
already has plans to do so by 2020.95 Privatizing launch services
promises to reduce the cost of launches, increase satellite
capacity per launch, and increase the quantity of launches per
year.96

for a waiver, which is approved on a case to case basis.”).
88. See id. (explaining that United States policy is detrimental to countries
with immediate launch needs).
89. Listner, supra note 13.
90. Id.
91. Selding, supra note 8 (“The rationale is that these non-U.S. launchers,
not bound by the constraints of profit and loss – [sic] but hungry for hardcurrency export earnings – [sic] will undercut commercial U.S. companies’
launch prices and keep them from gaining market traction.”).
92. Listner, supra note 13.
93. See Vyawahare, supra note 45 (indicating that many other countries
are vying for India’s launch services).
94. Listner, supra note 13.
95. Srinivas Laxman, Plan to Largely Privatize PSLV Operations by 2020:
Isro Chief, TIMES OF INDIA (Feb. 15, 2016, 9:15 AM IST), http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/Plan-to-largely-privatize-PSLV-operations-by-2020-Isrochief/articleshow/50990145.cms (“[T]he operation of [the Indian space
program’s] workhorse—the [PSLV]—will be largely privatized in four years.”).
96. Id. (“[T]he advantage of largely privatizing the PSLV operations is to
boost capacity and consequently increase the rate of launches from 12 to 18 [sic]
annually.”); see Aditya Madanapalle, Isro Plans to Involve Indian Industries to
Increase Satellite Launch Capacity, FIRSTPOST (Feb. 3, 2017, 12:01 IST), http://
tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/isro-plans-to-involve-indian-industries-toincrease-satellite-launch-capacity-360615.html.
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C. OTHER CONFLICTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF
LAUNCH SERVICES
The United States-India conflict is not the first involving the
international trade of launch services. In 1984, Transpace
Carriers Inc. (TCI), a United States launch service provider,
accused Arianespace of receiving subsidies.97 Europe countered
that the United States restricted its satellite market to United
States launch service providers only.98 The President of the
United States eventually determined that he would not take
action against Europe.99
In 1989, the United States signed an agreement with China
that allowed the Eastern power, for the first time, to launch
satellites manufactured in the United States.100 The United
States worried that China would run away with the satellite
market if left on its own, so the United States-China Agreement
contained two limitations: launch quota and price.101 In 1990,
China launched a satellite at half the price that Arianespace was
offering.102 In response, Arianespace accused China of violating
the Agreement even though Arianespace was never a party to
it.103 In the end, the United States took no effective enforcement
action.104

97. Fenema, supra note 24, at 449.
98. Frans von der Dunk, International Trade Aspects of Space Services, in
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 24, at 837.
99. Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 50 Fed. Reg.
140, 29631 (July 17, 1985); see Dunk, supra note 98, at 838.
100. Fenema, supra note 24, at 444.
101. Id; see Dunk, supra note 98, at 840.
102. H.P. Van Fenema, Cooperation and Competition in Space
Transportation, in THE HIGHWAYS OF AIR AND OUTER SPACE OVER ASIA 235
(C.J. Cheng & P.M.J. Mendes de Leon eds., 1992).
103. Id; see Dunk, supra note 98, at 841.
104. Fenema, supra note 24.
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D. SPACE LAW

Space law mandates international cooperation.105 The Outer
Space Treaty, which all major launching nations have ratified,106
states that “[i]n the exploration and use of outer space . . . States
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all of their
activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”107
E. THE GATS
The WTO consists of the WTO Agreement and annexed
agreements, which include the GATS.108 Together, they contain
the rules on international trade and a Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) for enforcing disputes.109
The WTO pursues liberalized world trade.110 The key to
trade liberalization is the breaking down of trade barriers at
national borders.111 The principle of comparative advantage,
which holds that countries will always increase their wealth by

105. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies art. IX, Jan. 27, 1967, 18.3 U.S.T 2410 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967)
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
106. See id.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION [hereinafter WTO],
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited June 22,
2017) (“Foremost is the Agreement Establishing the WTO (or the WTO
Agreement), which serves as an umbrella agreement. Annexed are the
agreements on goods, services and intellectual property, dispute settlement,
trade policy review mechanism and the plurilateral agreements.”).
109. See Overview: A Navigational Guide, WTO, https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm, (last visited June 22, 2017)
(“[The WTO agreements] spell out the principles of liberalization, and the
permitted exceptions. They include individual countries’ commitments to lower
customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open services
markets.”); Dispute Settlement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited June 22, 2017) (“Resolving trade disputes is
one of the core activities of the WTO.”).
110. See What is the World Trade Organization?, WTO, https://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited June 24, 2017).
111. See id. (“The [WTO] system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as
freely as possible—so long as there are no undesirable side-effects—because this
is important for economic development and well-being. That partly means
removing obstacles.”).
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removing trade barriers,112 already incentivizes countries to
trade with one another.113 However, domestic policies frequently
obstruct this from happening.114
The GATS confines its focus to liberalizing trade in
services.115 For example, the market access provisions, found in
Article XVI, prohibit measures that limit the “number of service
suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas” or “the total
number of service operations.”116 In a similar vein, the national
treatment provisions, found in Article XVII, prohibit member
states from indirectly favoring domestic suppliers by obligating
them to treat all foreign suppliers as nationals.117
But the application of these provisions is not automatic. The
GATS allows countries to limit the amount of market access and
national treatment they pledge in their schedule of
commitments,118 which contradicts the principle of comparative
advantage.119 Additionally, the provisions do not apply to
government procurement.120 Article XIII states that “Articles . . .
XVI (market access) and XVII (national treatment) shall not
apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale
or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial
sale.”121
The GATS also addresses national security.122 In order to
protect states’ security interests, Article XIV states that
112. See The Case for Open Trade, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
113. Id.
114. Id. (describing protectionism as a “siren call” that yields short-term
profits at the expense of greater long-term benefits).
115. See Overview: A Navigational Guide, supra note 109 (showing that the
GATS covers services).
116. See GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XVI, ¶¶ 2(a),
2(c), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS].
117. See GATS art. XVII.
118. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the
List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited June 24, 2017) (“For each service
sector or sub-sector that is offered, the schedule must indicate, with respect to
each of the four modes of supply, any limitations on market access or national
treatment which are to be maintained.”).
119. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 112.
120. See GATS art. XIII:1.
121. Id.
122. GATS Art. XIV bis.
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“[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed to require any
Member to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to its essential security interests.”123
Subsidies and emergency safeguards, addressed by Articles
XV and X respectively, do not contain binding language like the
articles covering market access, national treatment, or security
interests.124 Instead, they are part of the so-called “built-in
agenda.”125 “The [built-in agenda] reflects both the fact that not
all services-related negotiations could be concluded within the
time frame of the Uruguay Round, and that Members have
already committed themselves . . . to successive rounds aimed at
achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization.”126
Article X, for instance, calls for prompt negotiations on
emergency safeguards.127 Likewise, Article XV requires that
states negotiate on subsidies in order to “develop[] the necessary
multilateral disciplines to avoid [their] trade-distortive
effects.”128 In the meantime, it promises to give those hurt by
subsidies “sympathetic consideration.”129 The Sixth WTO
Ministerial Declaration instructed negotiators to “intensify their
efforts to conclude the negotiations on rule-making.”130

123. GATS XIV bis 1(a).
124. See GATS art. XV and X.
125. See The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives,
Coverage and Disciplines, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017) (“[V]arious GATS Articles
provide for issue-specific negotiations intended to define rules and disciplines
for domestic regulation (Article VI), emergency safeguards (Article X),
government procurement (Article XIII), and subsidies (Article XV). These
negotiations are currently under way.”).
126. Id.
127. See GATS art. X.
128. See GATS art. XV.
129. GATS art. XV ¶ 2.
130. See Ministerial Declaration: Annexes Adopted on 18 December 2005,
WTO, Annex C, ¶ 4, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min05_e/final_annex_e.htm.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF LAUNCH SERVICES
REQUIRES INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Countries struggle to cooperate with each other in the
international trade of launch services. Providers often accuse
foreign countries of violating trade rules.131 When this happens,
countries typically retaliate by claiming that they, too, are
victims of trade violations.132 These conflicts lead to trade
protectionism, as witnessed in the current stand-off between the
United States and India.133 The United States is blocking India
from freely launching United States satellites because India is
allegedly subsidizing its launch services.134
Noncooperation and protectionism is problematic for several
reasons. First, it handicaps the space economy,135 of which the
United States is particularly illustrative. When the StromThurmond Act was in force, the United States satellite industry
reported losses in the billions and a dramatic drop in market
share.136 Though Congress eventually repealed the
legislation,137 the satellite industry continues to struggle as a
result of United States policy with India.138 The inability of the
smallsat market to take off substantially reduces the economic
potential of the space industry because telecommunication
services are its largest subsector.139
131. See, e.g., Fenema, supra note 24, at 449 (stating that TCI accused
Arianespace of launching subsidized rockets); Fenema, supra note 105 (stating
that Arianespace accused China of subsidizing and dumping); Listner, supra
note 13 (stating that the United States accuses India of subsidizing its launch
services).
132. See, e.g., Fenema, supra note 24, at 449 (detailing how Europe
retaliated that the United States limits its satellite market to domestic
launchers); Listner, supra note 13 (detailing how India retaliates that the
United States is restricting its satellite market to domestic launchers).
133. See Vyawahare, supra note 45 (showing how the conflict between India
and the United States limits the United States from importing Indian launch
services).
134. Id. (explaining how United States satellites must go through a
complicated waiver process).
135. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 116.
136. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, supra note 75.
137. Dunk, supra note 98, at 435.
138. Madanapalle, supra note 9.
139. See Fed. Aviation Admin. Office of Comm. Space Transp., supra note 4,
at 2 (“[T]he commercial launch pie has not grown significantly during the past
decade . . . . There are some signs the commercial launch pie may be expanding,
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Second, countries’ refusal to trade launch services
constitutes a violation of space law. The Outer Space Treaty
states that “[i]n the exploration and use of outer space . . . States
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all of their
activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”140 Launch
services are certainly an outer space activity, so conflicts such as
United States-India are in breach of space law.141
Third, noncooperation blocks access to new business
opportunities. NewSpace is introducing new types of vehicles
that achieve economies of scale.142 SpaceX, for example, can now
earn greater revenue with less production costs because of its
reusable rocket.143 Greater economies of scale create business
opportunities by broadening trade space.144 However, the
inability to contract with foreign entities limits companies from
taking advantage of these fresh opportunities.145 Thus,
NewSpace adds tremendous pressure for international
cooperation.146
Last, the demand for telecommunication services is
geographically shifting. Countries such as India have enormous
populations that are just beginning to go online.147 The growing
Eastern demand can cripple Western launch industries if they
neglect trade.148 Therefore, the changing demand for
however. Several new launch vehicles are being developed specifically to
address what some believe is latent demand among small satellite operators.”);
id. at 1 (“At $95 billion in revenues, or about 29 percent, satellite television
represents the largest segment of activity.”).
140. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, art. IX (emphasis added).
141. See id.
142. See Economies of Scale and Scope, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12446567 (“Economies of scale are factors that
cause the average cost of producing something to fall as the volume of its output
increases.”).
143. Specifically, SpaceX is achieving “technical” economies of scale. See
Kimberly Amadeo, Economies of Scale, THE BALANCE (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.thebalance.com/economies-of-scale-3305926 (“Technical economies
of scale result from efficiencies in the production process itself.”).
144. See Oleson, supra note 26 (“The joint effects of all these changes [that
new launch vehicles cause] will expand the trade space for aerospace systems
engineering.”).
145. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 112.
146. See Oleson, supra note 26 (explaining how NewSpace requires
adaptability in the launch industry).
147. See Park, supra note 31.
148. See Dunk, supra note 98, at 839 (explaining how the United States has

2018] GATS REGULATION FOR LAUNCH SERVICES

301

telecommunication services threatens to further rupture the
space economy.
On the other hand, trade in launch services is brim with
potential if launch nations reduce protectionism.149 All stand to
benefit from increased trade because of the principle of
comparative advantage,150 and the untapped profit is
astronomical given the size of the space economy.151 Thus, if the
goal is to maximize wealth, launch nations must find a way to
cooperate.
B. THE GATS FACILITATES COOPERATION IN THE TRADE OF
LAUNCH SERVICES
The GATS can facilitate the necessary cooperation,152 as it
provides a regulatory framework where countries can trade
launch services effectively.153
Analyzing the United States–India conflict is an excellent
demonstration of this because it is a microcosm of the global
situation. Its central issues have already occurred in previous
conflicts. Like the United States, TCI alleged subsidization,154
and like India, Arianespace counter-alleged that the United
States restricted the use of its satellite market to United States
launch vehicles only.155 Similarly, Arianespace’s allegation that
China violated the United States–China Agreement served as a
precursor to the ongoing United States insistence that India sign
the CSLA because the United States, like Arianespace, wants
regulation.156 Neither of the previous conflicts witnessed any
already created launch service agreements with Eastern countries like Russia
and China stemming from fears that Eastern launch services providers could
otherwise overrun their own domestic launch service industry).
149. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 112.
150. Id.
151. See Fed. Aviation Admin. Office of Comm. Space Transp., supra note 4
(“The size of the global space industry . . . is estimated to be about $324
billion.”).
152. See Dunk, supra note 101, at 843 (explaining that once launch services
become more privatized and routine, that the GATS would be the best approach
to a trading regime).
153. Id. at 841 (“The unilateral character of these agreements
notwithstanding, the result of an embryonic global trade regime in launch
services—in the place, as it were, of any GATS/WTO-oriented approach—
continued to shimmer through.”).
154. See id. at 837.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 841.
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sort of resolution.157 As a result, resolving the United
States-India conflict solves many issues that have been left
unsettled.
The analysis proceeds by first demonstrating how the GATS
can resolve the United States-India conflict, and then debunking
the typical misconceptions that arise when considering the
GATS control of launch services.
1. The GATS Can Resolve the United States-India Conflict
The GATS framework allows India to launch American
satellites at whim on the PSLV without undermining the United
States launch service industry.158 With this in mind, both
countries should seek GATS regulation immediately.159 The
United States can finally end the tension between its satellite
and launch industries and soothe domestic relations.160 India
holds a crucial bargaining chip because it owns the world’s most
successful smallsat rocket at a time when smallsats are
desperately seeking orbit.161 Although India boasts that it can
take charge in the market without launching United States
rockets,162 the innovative United States launch service industry
will soon catch up to speed.163 Therefore, it is in India’s best
interests to negotiate trading rules during the short time it has
leverage.164
157. Id. at 838, 841.
158. See Yun Zhao, Liberalization of Space Launch Services within a
Plurilateral Regime, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 433, 441 (2006) (finding the WTO
to be the best way to liberalize trade in launch services, and that the United
States cannot continue to isolate itself in the face of growing world competition).
159. See Oleson, supra note 26 (“Large rewards await those who adapt most
effectively to the new opportunities [arising from increased trade space in the
space industry].”).
160. See Selding, supra note 8 (“One small satellite owner said his company
would go out of business if it had to wait for a reliable and cost-effective U.S.
small satellite launch industry to be created.”).
161. See Selding, supra note 45 (stating that the PSLV is appealing to
smallsats from countries across the globe).
162. Vyawahare, supra note 45 (quoting an Indian official that states that
ISRO does not need customers from the United States).
163. Madanapalle, supra note 9 (“The good times for Isro will stop as soon
as the US launch industry further matures and once the next generation of US
launch vehicles in development can serve the needs of US satellite launches.”).
164. See Listner, supra note 13 (“India is primed to become a player in the
commercial space but its continued reticence to create a legal and regulatory
regime to allow commercial space activities by its private citizens risks its space
industry to be left behind.”).
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The GATS specifically helps the United States by giving
them an advantage at a crucial moment in international
lawmaking.165 Article XV awards the United States
“sympathetic consideration” as victim to India’s subsidized
launch services.166
Having “sympathetic consideration” is key in trade
negotiation because the GATS, though lacking in binding
language, vehemently condemns subsidization. Article XV
requires that countries negotiate in order to “develop[] the
necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid [their] tradedistortive effects.”167 The legal obligation to discuss rules on
subsidies is an example of how extremely uncomfortable the
members of the GATS system are with allowing countries to
trade unfairly. The Sixth WTO Ministerial Declaration adds to
the urgency to create rules on subsidies by demanding that
countries “intensify their efforts to conclude the negotiations on
rule-making.” Therefore, the United States can expect the
“sympathetic consideration” to be substantial.
As such, the United States finds itself in a strong legal
position at a very pivotal moment in international lawmaking.
Countries must write trade rules on launch services
immediately given the harm without them.168 The United States
is under additional pressure because of the accelerating demand
for launch services in the East.169 Negotiating defensive trade
rules on launch services with Eastern powers is nothing new to
the United States.170 The United States-China Agreement, with
its launch and price quotas, is an example of the United States’
165. See Dunk, supra note 98, at 841–43 (explaining how the GATS ban on
subsidies may be crucial once countries such as India start providing launch
services).
166. See GATS art. XV, ¶ 2.
167. GATS art. XV.
168. See Kniper, supra note 43 (“Some companies are privately suggesting
that they may not be able to sustain business operations unless dedicated smallsatellite launchers become available in a short time.”).
169. See generally Yee Xiang Yun, Demand Rising in Asia-Pacific for More
Powerful Satellites, THE STAR ONLINE (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.thestar.com.
my/business/business-news/2017/08/07/demand-rising-in-asiapacific-for-morepowerful-satellites/ (noting the growing demand in Asia for satellite launch
services).
170. See Dunk, supra note 101, at 839 (“[Years ago,] fears arose in the
Western world that Chinese, Russian, and Ukrainian launchers would undercut
their global market shares by offering services at a much lower price. As the
United States controlled the satellite manufacturing industry . . . it took the
first steps to provide ‘rules of the road’ for establishment of a somewhat level
playing field in global launch services.”).
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prior history of bargaining with Eastern powers to mitigate their
strengthening launch services.171 Thus, it is in the best interests
of the United States to draw multilateral trade rules now while
it has legal bonuses such as “sympathetic consideration.”172
The GATS also helps India.173 Specifically, the GATS
improves India’s access to United States satellites. The CSLA
requirement that India price its services either at or above
United States prices violates the GATS because it is a limitation
on a service.174 Any limit on the total value of service
transactions, unless otherwise specified within the schedule of
commitments, is a violation of Article XVI.175
Albeit, the United States can avoid the violation by limiting
market access or national treatment obligations in its schedule
of commitments.176 Both of these courses of action defeat the
whole purpose of including launch services in the GATS and
make India unlikely to commit to GATS regulation.177
Fortunately, this will not be the case because the GATS, as
discussed above, is also crucial to the United States.178
Therefore, the GATS improves India’s ability to launch United
States satellites.
Some aspects of the GATS are equally beneficial to both the
United States and India. For example, the provision on
emergency safeguards incentivizes the two countries to
incorporate GATS regulation in the international trade of
launch services because with it, the United States does not have
to worry about the destruction of its domestic launch service
industry, which means that India can export launch services
more easily.179
171. Id. at 840.
172. See id. at 841.
173. See Listner, supra note 13 (“Whatever the rationale for India’s
reluctance to adopt a space policy and a true commercial space scheme, it pales
in comparison to the long-term benefits and positive geopolitical effect in terms
of prestige.”).
174. See GATS art. XVI, ¶ 2.
175. See Guide to reading the GATS schedules of specific commitments and
the list of article II (MFN) exemptions, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2017).
176. GATS Art. XVII.
177. See Knipfer, supra note 43 (noting market forces surrounding U.S.
protectionist policy and India PSLV providers).
178. See id. (explaining how the United States smallsat market needs access
to the PSLV).
179. See id. (explaining how the United States is willing to freely import
launch services from India so long as its home market survives).
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The United States may counter that it does not matter that
the GATS contains emergency safeguard measures if there is no
express permission to use them; they are merely part of the
built-in agenda.180 This is not the case. Notwithstanding the lack
of binding language, the GATS fiercely supports the use of
emergency safeguard measures.
The GATS will not idly witness the destruction of one of its
member’s industries without a whole-hearted attempt to find a
solution. Article X explicitly states “there shall be multilateral
negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard
measures.”181 Moreover, the Sixth WTO Ministerial Declaration
demands that countries “intensify their efforts to conclude the
negotiations on rule-making.”182 The sense of urgency shows
that the GATS should apply at least some sort of legality to
safeguards until the negotiations reach a conclusion.183 Thus,
the GATS will fervently strive to protect the United States
launch service industry if it ever reaches dire straits.184
Comity also obligates India to allow the United States to
exercise emergency safeguards if its launch service industry ever
faces destruction. Trade in launch services already abides by
comity. The MTCR, for example, is voluntary and informal,185
yet members continue to cooperate for the mutual benefit of

180. See GATS art. X.
181. Id.
182. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, Annex A, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_
e/min05_e/final_annex_e.htm (emphasis added).
183. See Gregory Shaffer et. al., Indian Trade Lawyers and the Building of
State Trade-Related Legal Capacity, U. OF MINN. L. SCH. 1 (2014),
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/shaffer/pdfs/2016%20Indian%20Trade
%20Lawyers%20and%20the%20Building%20of%20State%20Trade-Related%
20Legal%20Capacity.pdf (“The WTO should not be viewed as static and
deterministic, autonomously affecting states. Rather, the WTO legal order is
shaped by those who negotiate its terms and who participate in their
interpretation, affecting how WTO law is understood and applied. The
negotiation and interpretation of WTO law, in turn, affects countries’ policy
space for social and developmental initiatives as well as their ability to
challenge foreign countries’ trade restrictions affecting their exports. The scope
of the WTO legal order entails not only formal disputes, which are of great
interest and generate reams of scholarship, but also the shadow effects of law
on claims that are settled and never known and on domestic regulatory policy
initiatives that are advanced, not considered, or are shelved.”).
184. See id. at 7 (noting examples when prior WTO action spurred states to
exercise emergency safeguards).
185. See MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology
Annex, supra note 57.
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reducing the risks of weapons proliferation.186 Similarly, trade
in launch services depends on cooperation for the mutual benefit
of comparative advantage.187 India is undermining international
prosperity if it launches United States satellites without any
regard for the well-being of the United States launch industry.188
Therefore, the United States can expect India to allow for
emergency safeguards for reasons of comity.
The United States can also trust that India will allow it to
exercise safeguards because of space law. The Outer Space
Treaty states that “[i]n the exploration and use of outer space . . .
States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of
co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all of their
activities in outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”189 If the United
States satellite industry ever faces trouble, India violates space
law if it refuses to allow the United States to exercise emergency
safeguards because that is blatant disregard for the
“corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the
Treaty.”190 As a result, the United States can exercise GATS
emergency safeguards if necessary.191
Another aspect of the GATS that benefits both India and the
United States is the DSB. When TCI complained that
Arianespace was being subsidized, the United States
government did nothing about it.192 When Arianespace
complained that China was violating the United States-China
agreement, no enforcement action occurred.193 The lack of
enforcement is problematic because it discourages countries and
companies from trusting one another.194 Therefore, the United
186. Objectives of the MTCR, MTCR, http://mtcr.info/deutsch-ziele/ (last
visited Apr. 8, 2017).
187. See The Case for Open Trade, supra note 112.
188. See id.; OECD, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining that international
competition is fruitful to the space economy); Madanapalle, supra note 9
(“Indian satellite launches do not reflect the true costs of launching these
satellites. The US launch services are at a disadvantage because they are
pushed out of competition for the microsatellite and nanosatellite class of
payloads.”).
189. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, art. IX (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, supra
note 99.
193. Fenema, supra note 24, at 444.
194. A Unique Contribution, WTO, https:/www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2017) (“Without a means of
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States should be willing to commit its launch service industry
under the GATS because it contains enforcement mechanisms to
ensure that India stays true to the trade rules.195 Likewise, India
should be secure in knowing that the DSB prevents the United
States from breaching its own obligations, such as failing to
abide by its schedule of commitments.196
The analysis above illustrates how the GATS preserves the
United States launch industry even with waiver-less imports of
India’s launch services, and why both countries should seek
GATS regulation immediately.
2. The Misconceptions of the GATS Regulation of Launch
Services
Naturally, entering into a trading regime brings its own set
of issues.197 There are two major concerns that typically arise
when considering the application of GATS regulation:
government procurement and national security interests.198
First, government procurement may be relevant to the
international trade of launch services;199 even though
privatization is sweeping the space industry,200 some state
governments still control their own space programs.201 The
concern is that the GATS cannot regulate trade in launch
services because of Article XIII,202 which states that “Articles . . .
XVI [market access] and XVII [national treatment] shall not
settling disputes, the rules-based system would be less effective because the
rules could not be enforced.”).
195. WTO Agreement Annex 2 art. 22 (compensation is available for a
breach of the GATS); WTO Legal Texts, supra note 108.
196. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/
AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005) (stating that member-states that do not abide by
their schedule of commitments will be subject to discipline from the DSB).
197. See Dunk, supra note 98, at 841–43.
198. Fenema, supra note 24, at 443; Zhao, supra note 158, at 436, 439.
199. Zhao, supra note 158, at 439.
200. Hobe, supra note 1 (“The discernable trend towards commercialisation
and privatisation may in time pave the way for an international legal order for
commercial space activities.”).
201. Zhao, supra note 158, at 439.
202. See id. (“Launch services, following the example of telecommunications
services, could be the second category of space activities to be regulated by the
WTO rules. However, governments will remain major parties in the
transactions. Accordingly, it would not be viable to liberalize launch services
within the GATS framework, since government procurement is expressly
excluded from the application of the provisions of this Agreement.”).
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apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale
or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial
sale.”203 Article XIII certainly applies to the United States-India
conflict because the PSLV is owned and operated by the Indian
government . . . at the moment.204 India plans to privatize the
PSLV as early as 2020.205 The small timeframe means that any
concern over Article XIII is short-lived.206
National security is the second misconception that arises
when considering GATS regulation of trade in launch services.
Scholars argue that if the GATS controls trade in launch
services, then Article XIV becomes the GATS “baseline rule
instead of the exception.”207 India can argue, for instance, that
the United States can rely on Article XIV to dodge its obligations
by alleging that trading its satellites across borders is a security
risk.208 However, both the United States’ own legislation and the
MTCR demonstrate that importing launch services is a harmless
activity.
The repeal of the Strom-Thurmond Act in 2013, for instance,
proves that trading launch services cannot possibly be a security
risk.209 Although it guaranteed limited access to United States
technology by regulating all satellite exports under the strict
ITAR controls,210 the legislation infuriated the United States
satellite industry which in turn pleaded for legislative reform.211
The Departments of State and Defense themselves supported
the satellite industry by pointing out that the “sensitive”
technology was in fact already accessible in other countries,212
203. GATS art. XIII:1.
204. See About ISRO, ISRO, http://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro (last visited
Apr. 8, 2017).
205. See Laxman, supra note 95.
206. See Zhao, supra note 158, at 439 (“As a general trend, privatization is
an ongoing process.”).
207. Dunk, supra note 98, at 843; see Zhao, supra note 158, at 436
(explaining that countries may avoid trade in satellites because of their
sensitive technology).
208. See GATS art. XIV bis 1(a) (“Nothing in this agreement shall be
construed to require any Member to furnish any information, the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests.”).
209. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 431–36.
210. See Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999, 22 U.S.C. 2278 §§ 1511-1516, Pub. L. No. 105-261 (1998).
211. Fenema, supra note 24, at 434–35.
212. Aaron R. Hutman & Nancy A. Fischer, U.S. Congress Authorizes
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and “a substantial number of commercial satellite systems . . .
have become less critical to national security.”213 The eventual
enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013 proves that the Strom-Thurmond Act was
overbearing.214 Therefore, exporting satellites (or importing
launch services) do not threaten national security.215
The MTCR, of which both India and the United States are
members,216 also shows how trading launch services is harmless,
which means that countries cannot rely on the national security
loopholes found in Article XIV. First, the MTCR is eager to
accommodate for trade in telecommunication satellites because
the second category allows for more flexibility.217 The guidelines
can keep it simple by putting a general ban on everything, but
this deters trade.218 If trading satellites is compatible with the
regime against missile proliferation, then they must be
innocuous.
Second, countries already trade with each other under the
MTCR. Although the overarching purpose of the MTCR—to
reduce the risk of missile proliferation219—suggests that there
should not be any liberalized trading among launch nations, the
MTCR Guidelines explicitly state that they are “not designed to
impede national space programs or international cooperation in
such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.”220 Members
to the MTCR treat this language as a blessing to fully
cooperate221 even though exporting satellites to a foreign launch
Satellite Export Control Reform, PILLSBURY (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.
pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/us-congress-authorizes-satellite-export
-control-reform.html.
213. RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 52, at 1.
214. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 435.
215. See id.
216. MTCR Partners, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME,
http://mtcr.info/partners/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
217. See MTCR Guidelines, supra note 57.
218. See id.
219. Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, http://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitivemissile-relevant-transfers/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (“The purpose of these
Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that
could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for
such weapons.”).
220. MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex,
MTCR, http://mtcr.info/mtcr-guidelines/ (last visited June 3, 2017).
221. See Samanta, supra note 65.
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service provider can arguably be seen as always improving
another state’s missile programs.222 India, for example, can now
access high-end technology for its PSLV because of the trust it
earned after joining the regime.223 Therefore, trading launch
services is safe because even the MTCR, the most prominent
regime in mitigating the risks associated with trading launch
services, encourages countries to cooperate.
In sum, countries cannot claim national security risks as an
excuse to avoid trading obligations with launch services,224
which further paves the way for the GATS.
III.

CONCLUSION

The value of the global space economy has soared, reaching
a value of hundreds of billions of dollars.225 However, the
smallsat market has not kept pace226 because smallsat
companies cannot personalize their launch dates.227 Currently,
the lacking launch infrastructure in the United States limits
them to launching smallsats as secondary payloads.228
India’s rocket, the PSLV, caters towards smallsats229 and
earns worldwide demand.230 However, the United States
prohibits its satellite companies from using foreign launch
vehicles such as the PSLV.231 The United States reasons that
subjecting its launch market to foreign competition may destroy
it.232

222. See Fenema, supra note 24, at 419.
223. Id.; see also, Nilova Roy Chaudhury, India joins MTCR: Space, Missile
cooperation with Russia easier, RUSSIA & INDIA REPORT (June 9, 2016),
http://in.rbth.com/economics/cooperation/2016/06/09/india-joins-mtcr-spacemissile-cooperation-with-russia-easier_601593 (“[India’s admission to the
MTCR] should enable easier space and missile collaboration with Russia, which
could not supply cryogenic engines and other dual use technology missiles to
India, because it was bound by MTCR norms.”).
224. See Zhao, supra note 158, at 436 (“[T]he concern of technology transfer
has been used as an excuse by the United States to refuse to open the launch
services market.”).
225. See Space Report 2010, supra note 27.
226. Fed. Aviation Admin. Office of Comm. Space Transp., supra note 4.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Id.
229. Knipfer, supra note 43.
230. Id.
231. Madanapalle, supra note 9.
232. See id.
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If the United States-India conflict were regulated according
to the GATS, then the stand-off between India and the United
States would come to an end. This is beneficial to both countries
because of the principle of comparative advantage.233
Essentially, the GATS facilitates trading launch services by both
encouraging and compelling India and the United States to
abide by proper trade rules.234
Although the nature of launch services suggests
incompatibility with the GATS because of government
procurement and national security interests,235 in reality there
is nothing that will obstruct its application. Privatization is
sweeping the global space industry.236 Congress once restricted
satellite exports through legislation for security reasons, but
repealed that legislation in 2013237 because the widespread
availability of satellite technology makes protecting it a frivolous
exercise.238 Even the MTCR, a regime against missile
proliferation, encourages countries to cooperate in their trade of
telecommunication satellites.239
Noncooperation among the spacefaring nations, which is a
violation of space law,240 is needlessly hampering the space
economy.241 Countries can facilitate the growth of the space
economy by bestowing the launch service market to the GATS.
After all, global regulation is only a matter of time because
international interaction is only increasing. As former President
Jimmy Carter stated in a letter that is travelling aboard the
Voyager spacecraft on its current voyage: “We human beings are
still divided into nation states, but these states are rapidly
becoming a single global civilization.”242
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